Abstract: This poper su ggests thot libert orion ond ( reloted) controctorion ideos would be less vulnerable to certoin forms of criticism if they would more corefully disentangle their legal and morol stondords for the ossessment of Institutions from empirical 1 methodological 1 ond epistemologicol ossumptions obout individuolism and non-cognitivism. Holding apart severol meanings of individuolism differen t issues con be treoted seporately . It will be shown thot the justificotion of libertorian norms roises some problems which ore not too eosily solved within o non-cognitivist opprooch. No ottempt to solve them is mode subsequently but how for in principle the 'orgumentotion possibility frontier' might be shifted out for thot purpese is outlined. In this respect the poper might be regorded os o componion to Viktor Vonberg's brillant reconstruction of controctorion liberalism in this issue of .
Individuolism
There seem to be ot least three different approoches to individualism. For convenience I will refer to them os I-1 1 I-2 1 I-3 respectively. lt should be kept in mind thot these obbreviotions ore indicoting quite generol views . These views contain descriptive ond normative claims and usuolly some ossumptions obout on olleged 'logical' relationship between the two. Different stronds of argument should be kept apart from each other . It seems to be worthwhile to disentongle ·methodologicol norms from those morol ond legal norms applicoble to sociol Institutions or 1 for s ho rt 1 from institutionol norms. Norms of the first type ore guidelines for the process of theor y formotion ( i. e. meto-theoreticol norms ) whereos those of the second kind ore stondords for the evoluotion of sociol Institutions (i.e. norms which ore port of o normative theory).
The norms of methodologicol individuolism rroy opply to normative os weil os to descriptive theories. Methodologicol individuolism os opplied to descriptive theories of human behovior for instonce would require t hot fundamental theoretical explonotions in the lost resort hove to be bosed on lows which contoin only such variables which r epresent either human individuals or ottributes of human individuals . Ult imately variables representing classes of individuals and properties of classes of individuals ore excluded . As for os normative theories, especiolly ethical ones, are concerned methodological individualism entails meta-theoreticol no rms which require thot oll Statements of the normative theories ore bosed on individ ual 'ottributes' (in o very wide sense including individual judgements). F rom an oxiologicol point of view, for instance, nothing but individual attributes can hove intrinsic value. These normative (ond axiological) theories in turn may or may not suggest Institutions which ore acceptable from t he point of view of institutionol individuolism (i . e. marol or legal norms requiring a certain form of Instit utions which p r ovide for certoin rights of individuals) .
ln dealing with different approoches to 'individualism' we have to consider ot least three layers of discussion: meta-theoretical no rms , descrip tive ond normative theories obout sociol (institutional) reality, and sociol (institutional ) relality itself. Things seem to be come quite complicated here. We must try to sort out different top ics ond try to treot t hem separately.
ln an effort to outline o kind of conceptual map I will fir st deal with 1-1 to 1-3 in t u rn . Afterwords their relation to the problern of tru t h judgements in proctlcal matters will be discussed. Finally the results of t his discussion will be applied to the problern of justifying li bertorianism within the Iimits of non-cognitivist meto-e t h ics .
.!=..!_: Assumption: Only individuals and individual 'ottributes' ( whotever these may be including thoughts, feelings, judgements etc.) con give r ise to value. There exist no such things os collective volues, aims, interests etc. Methodological norm: ln an evaluation of soclety only individuols mu st be token into accou nt.
lf we take the assumption of 1-1 os 'descriptive' then it should be interpreted os o kind of self-evident t ruth about t he 'ontology of volue'. This ossumptlon, for example , excludes that there ore interest s of classes of individuols which in the last resor t would not be reducible to individual interests. Same of the scholors looking ot 1-1 os describi ng an 'ontological foct' tend to ossume implicitly too that the methodologicol norm may be derived from this 'ontologicol premise' without fu r ther normative ossumptions. As this, clearly, wou ld imply the derivotion of an 'ought' from an 'is' others t r y to treat the first part of 1-1 as a normative precept in disguise.
But, then, they simply hove stipuloted methodological .individualism in the premise. No argument -nelther valid nor invalid -to support that norm is presented.
I hove no quorre! with 1-1 if it is interpreted as simply stipuloting a methodologicol norm obout the odequote formotion of descriptive or normative theories. But we should be quite owore thot 1-1 in itself does not contain o valid inference to its normative conclusion. Keeping this in mind we con sofely t u rn to o scrutiny of whot 1-1 as a methodologicol norm entoils for procticol theory formation.
In the sense of 1-1 clossicol utilitorionism cleorly is an individuolistic theory. For, occording to this view individuols ore o kind of 'meosurement device'. Composing cin averoll or collective criterion using those 'volues' thot these devices provide is the oim of utilitorion theories. These theories ore using the 'scoles of individual devices' to meos ure the entries within the sum of averoll hoppiness. Clossicol utilitorionism, therefore, is not an egoistic opprooch to ethics. This holds true regordless of the foct thot in its most influentiol Benthamition version it was combined with an egoistic ond hedonistic descriptive theory of human behovior ond often, tho u gh mistokenly, hos been occused to be egoisticolly oriented in the normative sense. Utilitorionism incorporotes the feelings of .2!!_ human individuols or even oll sentient beings. Within this 'moin sum of hoppiness' every individual usuolly counts 'for one ond only one' which meons thot utility is a simple sum without discriminotory weights (cf. for o stimuloting recent defen se of utilitorionism the 'institutional' opprooch in Selten 1986 ).
The foregoing remarks obout 1-1 ond utilitorionism nevertheless should not be reod os to imply thot only utilitorionism could meet the requirement of 1-1. In foct 1-1 does not discriminote omong o brood voriety of opprooches which ore quite different from utilitorionism in normative cont ent .
There may weil be individuolistic theories in the sense of 1-1 which ore porticularistic and individuolistic ot the some time. For instonce, such theories might odmit thot oll human beings ore 'individuols' in o generol sense. But, in assessing sociol stotes they toke into occount only what is (intrinsicolly) voluoble to the individuols contoined in a proper subset of the set of oll individuols. This subset could be the group of, soy, the Zulus of Southofrico, the 'nordic roce' , or whot group ever. Such individuolistic and porticularistic theories will be indexed by o small p subsequently, e.g. "Ip -1".
On the other hond, though mony theoreticions would feel thot it is selfevident thot 1-1 is a minimal requirement of odeq uacy thot should be met by every acceptable theory -especiolly if it is of the normative vorietythere ore some theories, not entirely absurd, which vialote this condition. An exomple would stem from those porticuloristic collectivistic theories which select whot is taken os the interest of o porticulor notion, dass, or roce os the ultimate criterion of right ond wrang. The same would opply to o position storting from the 'interest of the human race' if ond insofor os this interest is not in the last resort 'reduced' to some 'attributes' of human individuals. The true ( hedonistic) utilitarian would reject this position at the some time as too particularistic 1 in excluding some sentient beings 1 and as non-individualistic 1 in olluding to the human roce os such .
Gradually turning to the next version of individualism it should be noted first that 1-1 still allows for the possibility t hat an individual other than the individual whose 'attrib utes' give rise to value may be a better judge of value for the per son concer ned than this ver y per son. T his possibilit y is not absurd. Choices have to be made in expectation of value. They are based on predictions. The "consciousness within" the measuring device (opologies to Gilbert Ryle for using this figurative description! ) 1 may not be the most competent judge of the utility 'expected to be measured'. In short 1 occording to 1-1 only individuals are the source of value but they need not ne ces sarily be themselves the best judges of what is or will be valuoble to them.
Here 1 cleorly 1 the donger arises that moral theorists might simply ascribe some value or other to individuals though these ascriptions have no warrant in individual 'attributes' or in what is valuable for the individuals themselves. Therefore 1-1 is usually strengthened in two ways.
First 1 it is required that what is valuable to individuols moy not itself be determined by moral theory but must rather stem from ~-morol value. This is typical for the utilitarian approoch which insists that o moral theory mu s t be moored to something outside the theory itself. According to utilitorianism t he criterion of moral right and wrang should not rely on a definition of value which is provided by the same morol theory. This would be circulor. lt would also be controry to the empiristic undercurrent of utilitorionism ond its main criticol thrust. For 1 historically utilitorions tried to destroy prejudices of conventionol morolity by an intersubjectively ond rotionolly controlloble criterion of right ond wrang in public motters.
Secondly 1 it is required thot the individuols concerned (neither the externol theoreticion 1 nor the morolist 1 nor the legislotor) hove to ossess themselves whot is voluoble for them. This requirement in turn can be understood in two ways: ~) as a methodological norm stating from which kinds of data theory formation (descriptive or normative) should star t and 2_) as a substantial ethical norm telling us how to orgonize sociol interaction itself.
According to the alternative a the criterion for acceptable theories of individual or collective norms must not only be derived f rom individual attributes but rather from individual ju dgements. This methodological requiremen t is a specification of the one which was discussed os 1-I. lt will be discussed os "1-2" whereas the alternative !!. which directly relates to social Institutions will be discussed under "1-3". 1-2: Assumption: lndividuols are the best judges of their own welfore; i.e. they know best whot is 'good' for them. Methodologicol norm: All value judgements must be derived from individual judgements or values revealed by individual choices. In the evaluation of society only individual judgements or choices need and may be taken into account.
Roughly the some remarks os those made in the discussion of 1-1 would opply to the methodological norm entailed in 1-2. Therefore, in the present context I will concentrote on the assumption olledgedly Jending support to the methodologicol norm contained in 1-2.
There are ot least three woys to interpret the ossumption of the thesis 1-2 :
I-2a: Definitional competence: 'Setter' in terms of value simply ~ that on individual occording to his or her own judgement or own choice regords some alternative as better than another one. l -2b: Foctual competence: As o matter of foct people alwoys know better whot is 'good' for them thon ony externe! observer could. I-2c: Prima focie competence: In finding out whot is 'good' for people there is no generol method which would be as reliable as to occept the individuols' own judgements.
l -2o: Definitional competence of the individual is reached if one should stipulate thot 'better' in terms of value simply meons thot an individual prefers some situotion X to a situotion Y. There ore still two possibilities here: First, an individual to his or her best knowledge says (in odvonce) that he or she prefers something; secondly, thot the preference is deduced from choices after these hove token ploce (which essentiolly seems to be Skinner's definition of 'better', cf. 1971, chap. 6, ond would be close to some stances token by economists). 8oth position s if token in the definitionol sense are devoid of empirical content. As definitional conventions they connot be wrong.
Nevertheless, such conventions con be more or less odequote in the sense of being more or less fruitful, precise, similor, ond simple. As the foregoing definition does neither ollow for o criticism of expr essed preferences nor of reveoled choices in terms of better or worse it would cleorly Iead to an explication which would deviote inodequotely from ordinary usoge. Further, we would still need other words or terms to describe what we ore doing in ossessing our own as weil as the choices of other people os better or worse for our -or themselves (cf. also recently Hirshmon 1985) .
Still, the economist moy not be convinced. For him o 'definitionol strotegy' lies close ot hond. One could easily orgue that the Ramsey-v. NeumannMorgenstern meosure of expected utility os an 'operotionolly acceptoble' measure of individual 'value' does not ollow for onything eise but the individuals' own preferences about risky choices or lotteries. This, it might be soid, is what after oll 'value' can and should meon os o methodologicolly occeptoble term.
But this proposol severely restricts the theoreticol perspective. For instonce, it is misleoding to soy thot somebody is octing in o certain way becouse he or she wonts to reoch a high er utility in the Romsey-v. Neumann-Morgenstern sense. This kind of utility as such is simply not one of the reasons for action. What a person wants to get are preferred stotes which ore merely represented by utility. lnsteod of this, in clossicol conceptlons of value or utility this 'variable' was used to exploin whot individuals did or do. Utility was not merely a shorthond representing individual preferences for brooder theoreticol purposes (e. g. those of gome theory) but hod os such an 'emotional' quolity. Utility was something ond not merely o representation of something. lt could be consumed and was not merely an indicator of preferred alternatives of consumption. lt was o motive on its own standing ond therefore could be used os a primory reoson for oction to recorrmend what indivlduols shou ld do.
Controry to thot, the modern utility notion only indicotes whot to choose if the reasons for choice ore already given. lnsofar this notion of utility cannot be used to recomme nd or criticize choices on the primory Ievel of motivation. ( To be sure, it can be used to critlcize miscalculotions etc.) But 1 people act under the influence of their own imaginotion. They imagine how they would feel if certain ste tes of offoirs should be reoched etc. In this context the concept of volue ond utility gets o twist which is very different of thot of merely representationol utility. As economists we oll tend to forget about this foct from time to time ond then we end up in o 'definitionol trap' which we should try to ovoid in our efforts to explain ond recommend certoin courses of oction. The concept of volue may be 'reduced' to o representing utility function only for certoin but not for oll purposes (cf. for the foregoing 'stondord observotions' the porticulorly cleor e xposit ion in Baumol 1972, chap. 22).
1-2b: One may also stipulate that individuals as a matter of fact always know best what is good for them. This, as weil as the definitional approach does not allow for exceptions. Therefore it is welcomed too by those who want to provide a foundation for rights claims which do not allow for any exceptions. But, at the present moment we are still discussing methodological rather than institutional individualism. Thus, quite apart of its doubtful logical credentials, this attempt to justify an institutional order directly on the basis of such a claim can be neglected. We have to consider only the methodological Ievel of argument. On this Ievel the premise that individuals as a matter of fact always know best what is good for them can only gain some prima facie plausibility if the approach becomes thoroughly particularistic.
For instance, children are not and cannot be regarded as being competent in this sense. Even after growing up many peoply are not, at least not without exception, the most competent judges of their own welfare. Therefore l-2b must either be interpreted as a general thesis which is meant to hold only for a proper subset of individuals or -which roughly amounts to the same -the term 'individual' has to be defined in a way that would make the thesis true by definition. In the latter case only those 'entities' for which the thesis holds true are admitted to the set of individuals. Though such a 'selfselection' of applications cannot generally be excluded from scientific procedure for methodological reasons alone it should be quite clear that it should be excluded in the present case.
On the other hand, if one does not take resort to such definitional 'tricks' some rather strong empirical claims about knowledge are implied in 1-2b even if we confine the thesis to a subset of individuals. These claims could become plausible only u nder the assumption of a kind of principally privileged access to one's own preferences which allows for no exceptions. I would not think that such a point of view in the la~t resort could be defended.
1-2c: lndividuals are only prima facie regarded as best judges of their own welfare. According to this view there is a general theoretical presumption that the best welfare judgements available for theoretical purposes are those made by the individuals concerned. Therefore so und theoryespecially normative theory -should tentatively start from what is regarded as valuable by the individuals concerned.
This argument is not without merits. Nevertheless, most individuals will enter situations in which there can be some expert who might be a better judge of value (especially future value) and who could better tell them how they should decide and how they should live than they could do themselves.
On the methodologicol Ievel the difficult problern orises of how to chorocterize those situotions which involve superior competence of the theoreticion. On the Ievel of evoluoting sociol In s titutions things might be mare simple. lt seems to be quite plausible thot there i s no relioble institutional alternative to letting individuals decide themselves. ln.dividuols should ot least be entitled to choose themselves whether they wont other individuols to choose for them.
In generol it moy be plausibly orgued thot on the institutionol Ievel we should s tick to generol rules or precepts stating that individuol s ore to be treoted os if they were without exception the best judges of their own welfore includ ing the decision to delegote such decisions to an ogent . But 1 this is quite far awoy from the original assumption of competence olledgedly supporting the normative claims in I-2 . It is no normative requirement of the methodology of forming odequote (normative or descriptive) theories. Insteod of this it proposes certoin forms of sociol Institutions. lt is not a meto-theoreticol requirement obout the adequote formation of normative theories of sociol Ins titutions onymore. It is itself an institutional proposal or 1 for that matter 1 a normative theor y of how to form 'good' sociol institutions. This Ieads to the third kind of individualism relevant in the present context: (morol or legal) in stitutional individualism.
1-3: Society should treat individuols in its marol and legal Institutions as having rights which moy not be chonged without preceding consent.
The thesis is usuolly specified in ot least two ways:
I-3a: We should respect the volue judgements of other individ uals regordless of whether we think they are wrong or right. Therefore we should treot individuols os autonomaus or as hoving the (moral ond legal) right to do whatever seems fit to them os Ieng as this does not conflict with the some institutional right of other individuols.
I-3b: Individual ogreement must form the bosis of any normatively justified change of institutionol rights . Ultimately the only occeptoble rule of changing collective Institutions is unonimity. Only unanimity con guorontee that I-3o -the priority of individual autonomy -is not violoted ond unanimity may be suspended only unanimausly in constitutionol choice.
I will r efer to both I-3a and 1-3b os one claim 1-3. This claim 1 though with some quolifications 1 forms the core of modern (contractuol) libertorianism. According to this approoch the ideo of the outonomy of the person requires thot persons choose themselves even if they choose wrongly. I-3 does neither depend on the ossumption that individuals hove priviledged occess to their own doto -which in a prima facie sense they certainly hove -nor on the conviction that other individ uols never could know better -they certoinly can sometimes. This institutional variant of individuolism requires that the decisions of other individuols -as for as they are self-regarding or stoy within the individual sphere -should be respected without exception. Even if other people moy k now better than the decision mokers themselves whot a good decision would be like they are not institutionolly entitled to interfere without prior consent. 1-3 is simply o rights thesis .
The thesis is o normative or prescriptive req uirement imposed on the choice of morol as weil os on the choice of legal institutions. It informs libertarian institutionol and 1 in particular 1 constitutional choice. Above oll it seems to be the centrat normative premise of Buchonon's 'constitutionol economics' (cf. on that esp. Brennon/Buchonon 1985).
If one subscribes to 1-3 one should be weil oware that it cannot -at least not without additional ossumptions -ond should not be defended by recourse to one of the theses in 1-1 to I-2b. The odherent of the maral claims of institutionol libertorianism would only weoken his or her position by making it conditional on such factual ond methodological claims as onolyzed before. ( Buchanon 1975 1 regardless of oll the other merits of his onolysis 1 ot leost sometimes provokes the impression of doing just that.) The libertarian should try to convince people by boldly orguing in fovor of his or her normative position. He or she should refroin from tr ying to sed uce them to occept 1-3 with suggestive but in the lost resort refutoble references to 1-1 to l-2b.
Espedolly 1-2 provides neither necessory nor sufficient reosons for the libertorian rights thesis. Some other reosons for 1-3 must be given. This is necessory though mony libertorions regord 1-3 os simply self-evident. B ut 1 this 1 it is not. For instance 1 in its more radical voriants it would preclude ~ forms of poternolism. This requirement is not eosily defended if we refroin from disguising bosic forms of poternolism os 'prevention of externalities' or redefine rights in a way generally ollowing for some sorts of poternolism. 8oth strategies 1 in any case 1 would Iead to o slippery slope.
At this s toge of discussion odherents of 1-3 quite often bring into ploy o new issue. This issue is reloted to the epistemic question of whether values can be subject to knowledge and olso to the ontological one of whether there ore any entities like objective volues. I will refer to this issue os 'the problem of cognitivism'.
Mony libertorions ot least unconsciously subscribe to 'non -cognitivism'. They also ossume quite frequently that there is some relotion between 1-3 ond the epistemologicol position of non-cognitivism. Controry to thot, I sholl orgue that the problern of individuolism ond especiolly 1-3 should be seporoted from the epis temologicol ossumption s of non -cogn iti vism proper. Though there seems to be some psychological relotion between individuolism and non-cognitivism the lotter does not 'logicolly' imply the former. Nevertheless, this is often suggested. -Before considering this line of orgument the meta-ethicol term "non-cognitivism" os used subsequently should be explicoted. This usoge is not confined to the discussion of modes of speech which hos been charocteristic for o !arge port of procticol philosophy of recent yeors.
Non-cognitivism
According to non-cognitivism oll justificotions of norms have to show thot the observonce ond/or enforcement of the norms can be expected to be instrumental to reoching given individual oims, desires, ideols etc. In this sense every 'ought' presupposes an 'is' (cf. Hozlitt 1964; Mockie 1977}. All justificotions of norms must be bosed on such meons-ends relotionships.
One must be careful here to distinguish the oddressee of o norm ond the addressee of the ju stification of o norm. To obide by o norm moy be detrimental to the pursuit of the oims of the oddressee of that norm. Nevertheless the observance and enforcement of the norm moy be helpful for the addressee of the justificotion of the norm. The addressee of the ju stificotion moy or moy not be port of the commu nity of the oddressees of the norm itself.
This often neglected distinction is of the utmost importance for an understonding of non-cognitivism proper. lt would merit further corrrT.ents. As these would Iead too for awoy from the moin argument it should suffice to point out that looking more closely at the distinction between oddressees of o norm ond oddressees of the jus tificotion of o norm one con easily see that octually two kinds of norms ore usuolly involved here.
On the one hand we hove norms or normative precepts to enforce norms, for instonce to proise and blcme certoin forms of behovior, to punish them etc. These norms typically are bosed on foctual relationships which suggest t hat to participote in the process of enforcing a norm would assist the enforcer in reoching his or her subjective ends. These relotionships ore usuolly pointed out in the process of justifying norms. On the other hond we hove prescriptions of thot kind of behovior the enforcement of which is recommended in the flrst type of norms. These prescriptions announce selective incentives to those individuols who ore expected to obide by the norms. ( Describing the process in other terms we might also say that the enforcers in providing selective incentives -retributive actions -produce a good which is public to them.)
After oll what has been said the central tenet of non-cognitivism rroay be rephrased in conventional Kantian meta-ethical language as stipulating that there are only "hypothetical imperatives". Justifications of these imperatives are stating a relationship between norms as means and individual aims (interests etc.) as ends. Contrary to that the cognitivist claims that besides and beyond these hypothetical imperatives and ju stifications there are other way s to justify norms. Knowledge of right and wrong in practical matters is not confined to the dernonstration of the instrumental value of norms in reaching given aims, desires, etc.
The cognitivist claims that there a r e some justifications of at least some norms which in the last resort entirely stem from knowledge. They are knowledge-based in that they are not rnoored to some given aims, desires etc. The insights showing that these norms hold true do not reduce to insights into merely instrumental relationships. The norms are known to be correct independently from these instrumental relationships. The justifications are also not merely relative to an addressee. The ultimate justification of at least ~ norms does not depend on an 'is' or on the fact that some aims, desires etc. as a matter of fact are shared by the addressee(s) of the justification.
The latter norms and kinds of justification according to Kantian terminology can be called "categorical". This term should be clearly distinguished from the term "apodictic" because it is a kind of 'mere coincidence' that within the Kantian framewerk the categorical imperative also is supposed to be apodictically justified. As far as the problern of how to justify normative precepts as such is concerned there is no (direct) analytical relationshipneither an incompatibility nor an entailment -between apodictic and categoric on the one hand and hypothetic and non-apodictic on the other.
In summing up, cognitivism may be characterized as stating that there are some categorical norms and some categorical justifications of norms. Contrary to that genuine non-cognitivism maintains that there are no categorically justified norms but only hypothetical norms and hypothetical norm-justifications. These are two mutually exclusive existence claims either about the 'ontology of value' or the 'episternology of value judgements' .
Non -Cognitivism, Individualism, and Economists
Within their science economists share the world view of non -cognitivism. Almost oll of them accept that as economists they rationally can discuss only meons-ends -relationships. In a next step mony of them tend to orgue thot institutionol individuolism in the sense of 1-3 is a logical consequence of non-cognitivism. ( "We cannot know whot ultimotely is right for people therefore oll individuols should have the right to decide themselves.") This could be a correct inference only if the derivotion of o norm from entirely descriptive (meta-ethicol) premises would be possible. Contrary to thot somebody can consistently at the same time be a non -cognitivist and nevertheless reject 1-3. It also connot be true thot cognitivism implies the denial of I-3; i.e. one con ot the same time be o cognitivist ond o normative individuolist in the sense of 1-3. Less formally stated these observotions would roughly amount to individual convictions of the following two kinds :
.2_) A cognitivist may cloim that she or he simply knows that 1-3 is correct. Then, cleorly, cognitivism ond I-3 would both hold true.
Thot the statement .2. describes a logical possibility seems to be almost self-evident. Moking use of the principle of universalizobility this consistency-cloim rright even be extended. And, this extension could take place in o way which would seem very plausible to mony people. lf we know, they would argue, thot acceptable ethicol principles must be universal then we connot hove ethically justified freedom or liberty in another thon o purely universal form. Therefore, lp -3 -the restriction of 1-3 to o subgroup of oll individuols -is no viable alternative to 1-3 for a cognitivist who assumes to know both: 1. thot moral norms must be universal, ond 2. that individ uals should live under libertarian Institutions.
The force of t he lost orgument 1 of course, depends on the acceptability of cognitivism itself. From a logicol point of view the non-cognitivist is free to refute it. ~) A non-cognitivist os a matter of foct moy hove aims, desires etc. which moke it recommendoble for him or her not to instoll 1-3 -at least not for everybody. Then, non-cognitivism ond non-1-3 (esp. lp -3) go together. This is also o quite trivial observotion. lt might for instonce be in the interest of some individual thot only he or she would have certain rights described under 1-3 while other people ore denied the very same rights. But, it is not trivial to ogree to the moral statu s of the hypotheticol norms showing such a person how he or she could reach this porticuloristic end. Many ethicol theorists would mointoin that norms which vialote the test of universolizotion could not claim moral status.
The ethical theorists are mistaken. Of course, one can define or explicate the term "moral" this way. But, this would leave it as an open question whether or not such systems of norms which are exclusively based on hypothetical principles and at the same time vialote the principle of universalization are viable 'functional equivalents of morality' in reality or not. This empirical or factual problern cannot be decided by a definition ( cf. for a helpful discu ssion of related problems Singer 1973}.
To be sure, even most theoretical non-cognitivists feel an inclination towards generalization most of the time they are discussing pract)cal motters. Many defenders of 1-3 amongst economists are no exception to this. At least implicitly they seem to argue that an individual i should accept 1-3 -and not only that part .!.e.:1 of 1-3 which concerns her or him or a specific group of individuals probably comprising i -as an egual right for oll because i would like to have 1-3 socially enforced and at the same time would know that oll others share the same interest with him or her.
But, regardless of allegations to the contrary this reasoning cannot invoke the status of an analytlcal truth. lf there is any truth in it it must be of an empirical or factual kind. This, in turn, Ieads to the empirical question whether somebody can accept lp-3 and -given the laws governing social behavior of human individuals -at the same time can rationally reject its universalization to 1-3.
From the point of view of a genuine non-cognitivist the justification for establishing and enforcing an egual rights system I-3 depends on both factual hypotheses and on the factual aims, desires etc. of the addressees of the ju stification. If individuals have the appropriate preferences, then, one will end up with the justification of a system of norms recorrrrending the enforcement of an institutional order incorporating I-3 if not so, not .
In general to some individuals the enforcement of 1-3 will seem and will indeed be justlfied as far as their aims, desires etc. are concerned whereas for others the enforcement of 1-3 would not be justlfied. As long as the argument is confined to the justification of hypothetical norms one cannot do better. In particular the typical non -cognitivistic 'institutional or constitutional economist' has to stay within these Iimits of means-endsjustifications because they are set by the basic assumptions of neoclassical econcmics itself (at least as they have been characterized in Robbins 1935 ).
. Non-Cognitivism ond the Argumentation Possibility Frontier
The lost remo rks should not be reod os to imply thot the economist sticking to hypotheticol norm justificotions hos reoched the 'orgumentotion possibility frontier' of his discipli ne. His argument about an extension of lp -3 to 1-3 has not to s top here. First, it may be repeated as o r eminder thot, though according to non-cognitivism the justificotion of norms is entirely relative to an presupposed 'is' of individual desires, oims, e tc ., this must not be con founded with 'egoism'. The 'is' con comprlse ony oims, desires, even ospirotions, ideols et<;:. whotsoever. Therefore the interest of on individual usuolly will not be confined to his or he r personal freedom or liberty. Secondly, it is possible if not even plausible t hot an individual who is interested in some liberties for him-or herself (and those who are neor to the individual) moy find out thot it is instrumental to his or he r own oims to have 1-3 instolled ond not merely lp -3 os o por ticuloris tic version of 1-3 which would comprise only o subgroup of the populotion in which person i tokes o direct interest . lp-3 empir icolly -for some reoson or other -moy r equire thot one porticipotes in the enforcement of o generol libertoricin system 1-3.
The non-cognitivist justificotion of 1-3 could then roughly r un olong t he following lines: If you, the oddressee of the justlficotion, wont to hove lp-3 instolled for your porticulor g r oup then you shold occept 1-3. You should por ticipote in its enforcement becouse this is instrumental to your own ends. 1-3 is the only Instrument ovailable for reaching lp -3.
Plausible as it moy seem, t his the sis, nevertheless, depends on whether certain empirical hypotheses are true or not. T hese, in turn, give rise to quite complicated consider ations. The 'because' is not a Straightforwar d one an ymore . It depend s on factual p references an d complex social relationships. -This is quite different from straightforwardly turning the thesis that there are no truth judgements in politics (and practical affairs in general) into the requirement that we 'therefore' should regard unanimous, if purely subjective, agreement os basic to the justification of political r ules, norms, or institutions.
Shifting out the Argumentation Possibility Fr ontier
Many non-cognit ivists feel uncomfortable with the assumption that 1-3 is based on nothing but 'mere' preferences and some hypothet ical or in strumental judgements which rela te it to lp -3 (and the oims, desires, etc. which are pursued by adopting lp -3) within the non -cognitivist framewerk of means -ends-relationships. Therefore these theoreticions are searching for somewhot 's trenge r' reosons which might demanstrete thot individ uals should respect the rlghts of ot her individuals. They ore looking for an argument which would be compatible with their own framewerk end at the same time suggest that rational individuals should strive for a system which grants the same rights to oll of them. The non-cognitivists seem to expect too thot this orgument should be easier to grasp thon the rather complicated empirical considerations about possible relationships between 1-3 end lp-3 end individual interests. They finally tend to assume that unconditional statements allowing for no exceptions would form a better end psychologically more effective foundation for libertarianism than conditional statements would.
Sometimes it is also argued that everybody if looking at his or her true interests would simply 'see' that it is in everybody's interest to have 1-3 enforced by society. Those who are not willing to accept 1-3 are allegedly in error as for os their own interests are concerned. But, h ere, one may ask how this argument would match the thesis 1-2 which is often accepted by the very same theoreticians who now argue from the true interests of everybody.
Still, some of those who wish to have 1-3 installed may claim to know that those who do not accept 1-3 share unconsciously some aims, desires etc. which would make it their own true interest to enforce 1-3. But, as a matter of fact they do not want to! They even do not feel obliged to hope that 1-3 be true. They want something eise. The non -cognitivist adherent of 1-3 will eventually run out of arguments.
The crucial normative issue which is involved here comes up most clearly if the adherent of 1-3 does presume that those who reject 1-3 as a matter of fact do know best what is 'good for them'. The tolerant non-cognitivist who accepts 1-3 cannot Iet the others have their way as far as 1-3 itself is concerned. He or she also connot treat Hiese people as if t hey knew best end again Iet them have their way. To be tolerant in this way ist not viable for the adherent of 1-3. For, 1-3 amounts to an institution from which nobody is to be excluded or can claim to be excluded. As an institution 1-3 is a public good or bad (a point which esp. Kant made in his "t-Aetaphysics of Morals"). Therefore, from the point of view of individual interests end of intetindividual agreement the situation Iooks somewhat like a stalemate if a partition of society into two different subgroups, one with the 'public good' 1-3 end one without it is not possible.
For the non -cognitivist there seem to be at least two ways out. The first arises from frankly accepting the fact that in the last resort the problern will be solved in a kind of Hobbesion struggle for power. This is quite similar to Popper's remark that we must be intolerant as far os the intoleronce of the intolerant is concerned. The non -cognitivist adherent of 1-3 -presumably, t hough not necessarily, using it as an instrument towards lp -3 -strives to get his or her way within this struggle end may succeed or fall. But, then, the non-cognitivist odherent of the equol rights oscrlption 1-3 should occept thot he or she is exerting an externolity on those who os o matter of foct do not develop preferences which coincide with whot even may be their own 'true' interests.
Nevertheless these non-cognitivist libertorions still might wont to shlft out the 'orgumentotion possibility frontier' somewhot further. This will Iead to o second r oute of escope from the stolemote. This second woy out storts from the lnsight thot for every soclol proctice whot people thlnk obout t hot very proctice is port of the proctlce itself ond may ploy o cruciol role within thot proctice. lt moy be orgued thot the somewhot simplistic madel of Hobbesion struggle for power hos to be madified occordingly. lt still con ond hos to be odmitted thot in the lost resort Hobbesion struggle will prevoil. But, by introducing human conscience and its relationship to certain modes of thinking (o nd thus parts of Popper's 'second' and 'third world' so to speak) we get a much richer picture. New arguments about the rational pursuit of interests become relevant because additional strotegles of individuolly rational behovior like influencing public opinlon, indoctrinotion, or rational orgument itself ore to be considered.
Even llbertorionism ond its 'natural twln' controctorionism con enter thot picture ond con possibly ploy an importont rote . A non-cognltlvist libertorion could orgue thot it is in the interest of certoin persons -for instonce those who wont to live under o legal order enforcing lp-3 ot least for themselves -thot individuols in society would think obout the Iegitimation of sociol Institutions in controctorion terms. This seems to be the view which some non-cognitivist libertorions ore groduolly toklng. They propese controctorionism os a "civic religion" ( notably Brennan/Buchanan 1985, esp. chap. 9; the whole book ending on o paragroph prospectlng "toward a clvic religion"). I think thot this approoch merits further development. lf certain empiricol conditions prevoil o contractarlon clvlc religion indeed might influence soclol practlce in a manner which could assist the addressees of this justification to reach their own gool lp -3 (or, going one s tep further in the hierarchy of justifications, those olms, desires etc. that gove rise to lp-3 ).
lt might also be speculated that o conviction system like 'con tractarianism' for empirical reosons might lend t he strengest support possible to o libertorian constitution. lndividuals who tend to think about constitutlonal politics in terms of a conceivoble unonlmaus controct ond who in thelr Imagination judge policy meosures occording to the stondord of concelvoble ogreement of oll individuols concerned should be less prone thon others to invode into the sphere of other people.
( To be su re, the troditionol controctorion arg ument thot those controcts thot would be ogreed on by o community of rational individuols in some fictitiou s situation can directl y comT.it real world actor s to certain action s is mistaken. For, either one has to cloim that without further argument it can be known that contractarianism is the correct basis for normjustification, or, one would end up with the thesis that those COITI'I1itments that fictitious actors would make in a fictitious situation would bind real world individuals. The fir st alternative is not viable for the noncognitivist. The second alternativ~ is evidently mistaken too. lt seems to be completely clear that a contract can only apply to those who have been party to it. Therefore, to repeat an old argument, a fictitious contract between fictitious individuals will apply to fictitious individuals only. Taking tagether the discussion of the last two alternatives, under non-cognitivist premises a direct application of contractarian arguments to the justification of 1-3 seems to be excluded. Further, even the applicotion of the notion of a contract as a criterion requires justification. Why should the noncognitivist be bound to use this criterion? Nevertheless, it may still be asked whether contractarianism might not be useful in a more indirect woy.)
Looking at contractarianism this way would defend it as a public ideology which in the last resort will s u pport the pur s uit of individual interests. Whether this defence will in fact lie within the argumentotion possibility frontier of non-cognitivism depends on empirical circumstances. lt is an empirical question too whether there will be selective incentives which moke it individually rational for a sufficient number of people to support and inculcate this kind of ideology. Here we moy hope that expressive behavior in situations where it has only low opportunity costs might be gratifying in itself. But, however we will solve these problems -which, by the way, are in generat characteristic for any non-cognitivistic approach to practical judgements -the social contract will b~ar the charocter of a public ideology or, for that matter, o civic religion and not thot of o normative argument which as such has a cloim to volidity.
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